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KOREMATSU, HAWAII, AND PEDAGOGY
Sanford Levinson*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TYRANNY OF SCARCE
TIME WHEN “INTRODUCING” CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
I begin with some reflections on my own career in
teaching—or, perhaps, attempting to teach—American
constitutional law to generations of students from 1975 to the
present. Or, more accurately, until about three years ago, when I
taught introductory constitutional law for the last time. I am quite
happy to no longer be teaching that course, whatever joys it did
provide me in the past, for a very simple reason: I became more
and more frustrated by the demands of coverage, i.e., the duty to
take up a variety of topics—including attendant cases and
collateral materials—and the unfortunate certainty that what I was
in fact doing was, at best, the barest skimming of rich surfaces.
As a matter of fact, I am quite certain that I covered far less
material than most of my colleagues, but that did almost nothing
to alleviate my constant feeling, freely expressed to the students,
that we were in fact “racing” through the material and, therefore,
doing genuine intellectual justice to almost nothing that was
ostensibly being discussed. I compared the course to a college
“mixer” where one engaged in several superficial conversations
hoping to elicit just enough information to know whether it might
be desirable to seek out further contact.
My ideal course, it turns out, is the one I taught at the
University of Texas three years ago in lieu of the introductory
course, where we spent the entire semester on four cases and two
speeches. I believe I titled the course “Reading Cases Really
Closely.” The course opened with James Madison’s speech on
the (un)constitutionality of the proposal to charter the Bank of the
United States, on which we spent several days, followed by seven
*
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full weeks on the case upholding the charter of the Second Bank,
McCulloch v. Maryland.1 We spent much of the time reading the
speech and case aloud, with frequent stops, sometimes after every
sentence, to discuss the argument being presented—or, often,
implied without full elaboration. Following spring vacation, we
turned to the other cases—Strauder v. West Virginia,2 Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,3 several of the opinions in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,4 plus a speech by Frederick
Douglass on constitutional interpretation.5 That was it, and even
then, I felt that we were racing through the post-vacation
materials, since so much more could have been said (and
discussed) than we had time for.
Indeed, I find one of the genuine oddities—perhaps
“pathologies” would be the more appropriate term—of the
American legal academy to be its pretense that it teaches students
how to read and analyze cases. How can that really be, given the
remarkable paucity of time spent on any given case—and its
actual text—that happens to be assigned? Students almost never
read a case in its entirety, and this is true even of the sections of
an opinion that follow what are often histories of the procedure of
the particular case and how it happened to arrive at the Court at
all. There is simply not the time. I often compare the way we
“introduce” constitutional law to impressionable students to a
course, say, on “The American Novel” that would include two or
three chapters from Moby Dick—a book some students might
believe to be about whaling—before moving on to selected
chapters from Huck Finn and so on. There might be some value
to such a course, but no one should believe that it has much to do
with genuinely grappling with what either Melville or Twain
wrote—or what they might have thought they were really writing
about. In the casebook that I co-edit, Processes of Constitutional
1. See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480-90 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (detailing the
speech James Madison gave in Congress on Feb. 2, 1791 opposing the National Bank); see
generally 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
2. See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
3. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
4. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
[hereinafter Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer].
5. See generally Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It ProSlavery or Anti-Slavery (1860), in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM VOLUME II: RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES (Howard Gillman et al. eds., 2013).
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Decisionmaking, the one and only case that is reprinted without
editing is McCulloch.6 All other cases are significantly edited,
even though a feature of our very long casebook is that it includes
fewer overall cases than do any of our competitors. Those cases
we include are less severely edited, but edited they most certainly
are. Perhaps it is worth noting that one of the very first seminars
I ever gave at the University of Texas Law School, where I have
now been teaching for forty years, focused on the editorial
process itself. Students were invited to offer their own edits of
given cases, with memoranda supporting their decisions as to
what to include and what to cut.
I note, incidentally, that in the “Reading Cases Really
Closely” course, we spent some significant time comparing how
different casebooks presented the cases we were reading and what
difference the editorial decisions made to one’s understanding of
the case. If, as is common, the “factual” background of the “case
and controversy” was more-or-less omitted, then that raises
obvious questions for students trying to “brief” the case. What,
are, for example, the “facts” of Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer?7
Hugo Black, in his majority opinion, barely informs the reader
that something called the Korean War is going on, whereas Chief
Justice Vinson, in his dissent, spends pages—never presented in
casebooks—explaining why that War is in fact the opening battle
of World War III.8
So, what does this have to do with responding to Mark
Killenbeck’s truly superb article on Korematsu (and, let us not
forget, Hawaii)?9 The answer is simple. I know of literally no
article better suited to introduce students to the complexities of
constitutional analysis, though the caveat is that such an
introduction would require spending an extensive amount of time
not only on the cases themselves, but also, and just as importantly,
on the absolutely crucial questions that Killenbeck asks on almost
literally every page. This is not an article to be skimmed. It must
be grappled with in just the same way that Killenbeck does for
6. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
AND MATERIALS 39 (7th ed. 2018).

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES

7. See generally Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. Id. at 582-84 (majority opinion); see also id. at 668-73 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
9. See generally Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu
Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 151 (2021).
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104 manuscript pages. Indeed, my one and only criticism of the
essay is that it is too short. I firmly believe that it can—and
should—be doubled in size in order to become a truly essential
book for students and their professors alike, on what “case
analysis” really requires, unlike the desiccated version that
professors feel forced to present given the tyrannical demands of
“coverage” within a limited amount of time.
A full “commentary” or “response” to the article could easily
take up this entire journal, so I will limit myself to offering a few
observations. But the main message is to read every page that
Killenbeck wrote with the utmost care.
II. WHO GETS TO OFFER AUTHORITATIVE
DESCRIPTIONS OF KOREMATSU?
It is appropriate to begin literally at the start of Killenbeck’s
article in order to demonstrate the validity of the previous
sentence. The first sentence asks the reader to answer an
important question: “How to best describe . . . Korematsu v.
United States?”10 One might simply respond saying, altogether
accurately, that it is one of the most reviled decisions of the
twentieth century. Unlike, say, Lochner v. New York, which was
presented to several generations of students as a clear
abomination before receiving revisionist approval from some
contemporary scholars,11 Korematsu has no real advocates,
especially in terms of its results, within the legal community. If
the “canon” of American constitutional law includes, at its best,
those cases we are proud to present to students as models either
of legal reasoning or moral sensitivity—and, ideally, both—then
the “anticanon,” as elaborated by Columbia law professor Jamal
Greene, includes cases that are, perhaps, best described as
modeling terrible legal reasoning or abject moral obtuseness,
often both.12
Thus, Killenbeck’s fourth sentence quotes
10. Id. at 151.
11. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1-3 (2011). Other prominent defenders include
Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and
Persons, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334 (2005); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: What’s so Wicked About
Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 325 (2005).
12. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380-82 (2011).
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Professor’s Greene own description of Korematsu as founded “on
little more than naked racism and associated hokum,”
exemplifying “a set of propositions that all legitimate
constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.”13 It is,
together with Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner the
leading exemplars of the “anticanon.”14 But Greene is merely a
law professor, however distinguished.
Far more important, of course, is the statement found early
in paragraph two by Chief Justice Roberts in his opinion for the
Court in Trump v. Hawaii. Perhaps prodded by Justice
Sotomayor, who unkindly (though some of us would say
altogether correctly) suggested that Roberts’s opinion upholding
President Trump’s ban on travelers from seven selected countries,
all of which happened to be heavily Muslim, was reminiscent of
the Court’s decision in Korematsu, Roberts almost gratuitously
took the opportunity not merely to distinguish the two cases, but,
more dramatically, to attempt to eviscerate Korematsu as part of
the Supreme Court’s legacy.15 “Korematsu,” he proclaimed,
“was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in
the court of history, and—to be clear—’has no place in law under
the Constitution.’”16
Nothing that could really be described as an argument
accompanied this statement. There is no explanation as to why
one of the most distinguished Supreme Courts in our history
engaged in such an egregious error. Were the Justices in the
majority stupid? Or were they out-and-out malevolent, setting
aside their duties to the law in order to serve ulterior motives? To
describe them as knaves or as fools seems to be the only available
option once one describes a decision as “wrong the day it was
decided” and, in the words taken from Justice Jackson’s dissent,
having “‘no place in law under the Constitution.’”17 What a
wonderful opportunity to teach students about the rhetoric found
in the Supreme Court. And, importantly, only in the Supreme
13. See id. at 380, 423. My own reflections on Greene’s essay can be found at Sanford
Levinson, Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time? Why Prigg is Worse than
Dred Scott (But Is Likely to Stay Out of the “Anticanon”), 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 23, 32
(2012), https://perma.cc/3PC3-38V3.
14. See Greene, supra note 12, at 380.
15. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
16. Id.
17. Id; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Court, as distinguished, say, from opinions written by judges of
what the Constitution is pleased to label “inferior courts.”18 They
are required, according to the Supreme Court itself, to implement
any and all Supreme Court precedents unless and until the Court
itself declares that they are no longer “good law.”19 It really
doesn’t matter if an “inferior” judge believes that a given
Supreme Court opinion was “wrong the day it was decided.”20
But Supreme Court justices are different. As Justice Frankfurter
explained in a 1939 concurring opinion overruling an 1871
decision of the Supreme Court, justices take an oath to be faithful
to the Constitution, not to prior cases of the Supreme Court.21 It
appears, though, that as a matter of practice, that is not the correct
interpretation of the linguistically similar oath that “inferior”
judges take. Indeed, it is worth asking about the meaning of the
oath taken by presidents and all other public officials.
Roberts’ sentence, precisely because it is unaccompanied by
genuine argument, is perhaps a perfect example of what the
English philosopher of language J. L. Austin labeled a
“performative utterance.”22 Its very declaration by an authorized
speaker—in this case the Chief Justice writing for a majority of
the Court—is enough to establish it as true.23 As one might infer,
it might be worth taking some class time both to discuss the nature
of performative utterances and how it is that only some people are
authorized to make them. Professors fulminate against decisions
with some frequency, and students quickly learn that whatever
they say about the professor, the denunciations have no legal
authority whatsoever. It is as if a best friend, without any
authority from the state, attempted to declare that A & B are now
“lawfully married.” Unless the state has invested authority to do
so, perhaps because it recognizes the validity of a certificate
issued by the Universal Life Church, that declaration has no more
binding force than my own statement that a given decision of the
Court is an unreasoned abomination (which I have been known to
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
19. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994).
20. See id.; see also Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
21. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (1962).
23. See id. at 8-9.
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offer). But that may be only to say that Professors Greene and
myself are merely law professors, while John Roberts is
authorized to make law, at least if he has the concurrence of four
colleagues, which includes casting into judicial purgatory—if not
outright Hell—an almost seventy-five-year-old case without
briefing or argument before the Court itself.24
One might well be curious where Roberts’ authority to make
such performative legal utterances comes from. Crucially, is it a
product exclusively of the office that he inhabits—i.e., being a
justice of the United States Supreme Court—or does it have
anything at all to do with any personal characteristics he might
have? This invites a discussion of what qualifications, if any,
someone must have in order to serve on the United States
Supreme Court. (One might begin by reading the text of the
Constitution itself and comparing it, perhaps, with the text of
some other national constitutions with regard to stating who is
qualified to become a member of its apex court.)
As a matter of fact, there is only one current member of the
Supreme Court who is officially “learned in the law.” That is
Elena Kagan, and the reason is that in order to become Solicitor
General of the United States, the office she inhabited prior to her
appointment to the Court in 2011, she had to be officially judged
to be “learned in the law.”25 (Perhaps it helped that she was Dean
of the Harvard Law School!) Indeed, one might well ask students
if they in fact know anything at all about the nine members of the
Supreme Court. Who exactly are Samuel Alito or Stephen
Breyer? Or, if one really wants to be cruel, who were Sherman
Minton, Harold Burton, Fred Vinson, and Tom Clark, Harry
Truman’s four appointees who were distinguished principally by
being friends of the President?
What might it say about the American legal system that we
take on faith, as it were, the binding nature of pronouncements by
people about whom we often know almost nothing at all save for
their occupying the relevant office? Perhaps this would be an
appropriate occasion for quoting one of the most terrifying
passages in all of Shakespeare, from King Lear: “Thou hast seen
a farmer’s dog bark at a beggar?” Lear asks the blinded Earl of
24. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 505.
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Gloucester.26 Upon Gloucester’s agreement, Lear then observes,
“And the creature run from the cur? There thou might’st behold
the great image of authority: a dog’s obeyed in office.”27 Is this
seditious, or simply a powerful truth about political authority,
including the authority attached to judicial pronouncements?
III. KOREMATSU AS PART OF THE CANON (AND
ANTICANON)
We are only at the beginning of page six, and we have not
yet even mentioned what Killenbeck himself regards as his main
argument. That argument, in fact, is that we ignore Korematsu—
or exile it from our syllabi—at our peril; he believes that it very
much deserves to be part of what Jack Balkin and I once labeled
the “pedagogical canon”28 that should be taught to all students
because of the importance of the lessons it teaches. Killenbeck
demonstrates that the lessons are (at least) twofold, running in
absolutely opposite directions. It amply deserves its status as part
of both the canon and what Greene labeled the “anticanon.”29 So
unlike Mark Antony with Julius Caesar, Killenbeck comes both
to praise and to condemn Korematsu, which is why his article is
so important and worth closely reading. He is no admirer of the
actual holding of the case. Indeed, he is harshly critical of the
legal process that produced it, and by that he is referring not only
to the arguments articulated in Justice Black’s Opinion for the
Court, but also the lawyering of the Department of Justice, which
almost certainly transgressed certain basic lines of legal ethics,
discussed more below.30 He thinks it important that students
know of all of this in order to understand that the law does not
always work itself pure, that the process itself can be gravely
defective, with attendant costs both to the fabric of the law and,
more importantly, to the victims of the given decisions.31 But, as

26. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6.
27. Id.
28. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 975 (1998).
29. Greene, supra note 12, at 386.
30. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180; see also infra Part IV.
31. See Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180-89.
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already suggested, that is not the only reason that Killenbeck
wants Korematsu to be taught.
In addition, he applauds the decision for its formal doctrine,
even if not for the application of the doctrine. That is, Korematsu
is a major source of the “strict scrutiny” doctrine with regard to
the use of racial or national origin classifications in the law.32 The
Equal Protection Clause, described in 1927 as the “last resort” of
desperate lawyers unable to come up with a genuine legal
argument,33 became, in part because of Korematsu, one of the
linchpins of American constitutional argument following World
War II.34 It would have been unthinkable seventy-five years ago
to have a full-semester course on “The Equal Protection Clause;”
indeed, one wonders if the Clause would even have supported two
weeks of interrogation. Today, on the other hand, the only
question is whether a semester is long enough to handle all of the
intricacies of doctrine produced by the movement of the Clause
to center state. Students ought to be aware of this aspect of
American constitutional development, and Killenbeck’s
treatment of Korematsu offers a splendid introduction to that
development.
So Korematsu is intensely interesting to doctrinalists, partly
as an origin story, but, I want to suggest, also as a demonstration
of the complexities of the doctrine itself. Return to Professor
Greene’s dismissal of Korematsu as exemplifying “naked racism”
and little else.35 Chief Justice Roberts’ overruling of the case is
congruent with this understanding: “The forcible relocation of
U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of
Presidential authority.”36 But is that in fact a correct description?
What, after all, is the “racial category” that is the basis of the
lamentable detention in what Roberts accurately calls
“concentration camps?”37 The answer is deceptively simple: it is
membership within the Japanese nation, whether by birth, as with
32. Id. at 189-201.
33. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
34. See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies
in the Hearts of Men and Women”, 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011).
35. Greene, supra note 12, at 423.
36. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (emphasis added).
37. Id.
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those Japanese nationals who were in fact prohibited from
becoming American citizens by dreadfully discriminatory
naturalization laws,38 or, even if American citizens by virtue of
having been born here, were nonetheless suspected of retaining a
dangerous degree of national loyalty to their parents’
“homeland.” And, of course, Korematsu takes place against the
background that the political authorities claiming to represent that
nation—including an Emperor who further claimed a Divine
mandate to rule—had attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor,
with devastating consequences, on the day that President
Roosevelt proclaimed would “live in infamy,” December 7,
1941.39 Presidential Order 9066 was a response to Pearl Harbor
and the perceived dangers coming from the organized Japanese
nation.40
When I used to teach Korematsu, one of my points is that it
might force us to acknowledge the practical difference between
mere “minimum rationality,” as a justification for governmental
policy, and a “heightened” degree of scrutiny that would demand
more than acknowledging the possibility that a non-lunatic might
believe that a given policy “made sense.”41 That is, was it, at the
beginning of 1942, truly “irrational” to believe that Japanese
nationals, even if resident aliens within the United States, and
even the children of those nationals, might be sufficiently torn in
their loyalties to present potential dangers to American national
security should, for example, Pearl Harbor be simply the
forerunner to an attack on the continental United States itself? We
know now that that notion was fanciful, but was it necessarily so
at the time? But my point was that it might not be enough simply
to concede that what might well be perceived as rank bigotry
against Japanese nationals and their American-citizen children
was not, for that reason, completely “irrational.”
After all, as I pointed out, American policy for many decades
was replete with what can only be described as such rank bigotry,
38. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, repealed by
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
39. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “December 7, 1941—A Date Which Will Live in Infamy”—
Address to the Congress Asking That a State of War Be Declared Between the United States
and Japan (Dec. 8, 1941), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 514, 514 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
40. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
41. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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which, as a general matter, might well deserve to be described as
“racist.” After all, Fred Korematsu’s parents were not citizens
because American law at the time prohibited all Asians from
becoming citizens.42 That was modified in 1943 to allow Chinese
immigrants to become citizens, no doubt because it was
embarrassing to continue our traditional bigotry at a time when
we were allied with the Republic of China in the great struggle
against Japan in the Pacific theater of World War II.43 But it
would not be until the 1950s that the ban against Asians in general
would be lifted.44
Killenbeck demonstrates beyond doubt that the detention of
Japanese resident aliens and their American-citizen children was
tainted by abject bigotry.45 All one needs to do is to read the
comments of General DeWitt in that regard.46 But even if we
agree with Killenbeck’s
assessment—and one of the
achievements of his powerful essay is its elaboration of the depth
of the bigotry behind the policy—the question remains, at least
for me, as to whether Killenbeck is correct in writing of
“Korematsu’s embrace of naked racial stereotyping.”47 Should
we not at least acknowledge that “national origin discrimination”
is analytically distinguishable from “racial stereotyping” and,
therefore, must be taken on its own terms, even if we end up
condemning both. (Similar questions, of course, might be raised,
as in Hawaii, by anti-Islam bigotry. Still, I assume that no one
would describe Muslims as a “race.” All forms of discrimination
might be lamentable, but that does not lead to the conclusion that
all forms are necessarily alike or can be neatly collapsed into one
another without paying some genuine analytical costs.)
So I will confess that in the past I was inclined to describe
Presidential Order 9066 as meeting the test of “minimum
rationality,” but, nonetheless, to affirm the validity of Justice
Murphy’s eloquent dissent; that it was so draconian in its
implications for the lives of the roughly 120,000 fellow
42. JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE, THE JOURNEY FROM GOLD MOUNTAIN: THE
ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 9-10 (2006).
43. K. Scott Wong, The Opening of the Law in the Pursuit Asian American History, 13
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 325, 325 (2010).
44. Id. at 326 n.2.
45. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 167-76.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 156.
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Americans (citizens or not) subjected to it that it should have been
assessed by higher standards.48 Killenbeck demonstrates beyond
doubt that it was indefensible under stricter scrutiny.49 There was
simply no evidence of perfidy by enough persons of Japanese
descent that it should have been regarded as acceptable to subject
them as a collectivity to curfews and then detain and exile them
into concentration camps far away from their homes. Of course,
there turned out to be no evidence of any perfidy by what might
be termed the target population. One might accurately take this
as evidence of the remarkable loyalty of those rounded up to the
United States, a conclusion only strengthened by the
achievements of the famous 442nd Nisei regiment, composed of
second-generation Japanese-Americans, that, while fighting in
the European theater of operations, became the most decorated
regiment in American military history, including twenty-one
Medal of Honor winners.50 One of the reasons I regard this as
“remarkable” is precisely that persons of Japanese ancestry had
so many good reasons to feel angry—and perhaps even disloyal—
to a country that had systematically discriminated against them
and refused to accept even the possibility that a Japanese
immigrant might become part of the American political
community.
In this sense, Dred Scott lived well after its formal overruling
by the Fourteenth Amendment.51 It might have made Fred
Korematsu a citizen, but his parents remained permanently
tainted. To be sure, one might in fact describe that, at least prior
to World War II, as evidence of “naked racism,” insofar as all
non-Caucasians (other than immigrants from Africa, thanks to the
1870 modification of the original, thoroughly racist immigration
act of 1790 that Taney, of course, cited in Dred Scott), were
barred from citizenship.52 But by 1942, the “naked racism” had
surely been joined with an animosity based on ascribed
membership in the particular Japanese community that had
48. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting);
JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE, supra note 42, at 29.
49. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180-89.
50. JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE, supra note 42, at 14, 31.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 419 (1857); JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS
LEAGUE, supra note 43, at 4.
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chosen to attack the United States. If one looks around the world
at the history of ethnic- and nationality-based conflict, one finds
all too often that deep animosities endure through decades and
even centuries. For starters, look at Northern Ireland, the South
Balkans, or the unending conflicts in the Middle East. It is often
“rational” to expect the worst, even as visionary political
leadership—think of Nelson Mandela—is willing to take a leap
of faith and hope for the best. I’m quite willing to argue that the
Constitution requires such leaps, at least on occasion, but, surely,
others disagree. In any event, it seems clear that whatever the
rhetoric adopted by Justice Black about “strict scrutiny,” the
majority certainly did not apply it.53 It did, one might argue, apply
a “compelling interest” test, but that is only to say that anything
presented as relating to national security, especially during time
of war, will in effect be rubber-stamped by the judiciary, exactly
the situation that Justice Jackson warned against in his somewhat
cryptic dissent.54
Killenbeck, like many others, argues that whatever might
rationally have been believed in the days after Pearl Harbor was
disconfirmed by what was unequivocally known at the time of
argument before the Court, which should have led the justices to
invalidate 9066.55 This, of course, raises the general problem of
the relevance of after-acquired information in evaluating policies
determined at an earlier date, a subject that Killenbeck discusses
at some informative length late in his article. Much could be said
about this general problem, but I will leave that for another day.
IV. LAWYERS AS TECHNICIANS
The last topic I want to take up in these brief comments
involves the pictures of lawyering depicted by Killenbeck,
particularly in his attempt to contrast Korematsu with Hawaii.
With regard to the former, I think it is fair to say that he presents
a devastating portrayal of the lawyers who defended 9066 in front
of the Supreme Court.56 They were fully aware of the unbridled

53.
54.
55.
56.

See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216; id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 218; id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180-82.
See id. at 176-80.
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bigotry of General DeWitt, the architect of the detention policy.57
More to the point, they were also fully aware that by the time the
case was before the Court, there was literally no real evidence to
support the policy. That fact was brought to the attention of those
in charge of litigation, and they basically did nothing. They
basically chose the role of zealous advocate, determined to justify
the policy adopted by President Roosevelt in 1942. The lawyers
involved were not “nobodies,” as it were. They included, among
others, Charles Fahy and Herbert Wechsler.58 Fahy was Solicitor
General of the United States from 1941 until 1945 and would later
serve for many years as a member of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.59 Wechsler, who joined the
Columbia Law School faculty immediately after clerking for
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in 1931, served in the Department of
Justice during the War and argued several cases before the
Court.60 He would go on to serve as the long-time president of
the American Law Institute. It is safe to say that neither paid any
professional price for the decisions they made in effect to
suppress relevant evidence that might have conceivably been
interesting to the Justices.
Killenbeck is highly critical of the way that Korematsu was
presented to the Court, precisely because there was solid evidence
of the government’s overreach and, not to put too fine a point on
it, bigotry as part of the explanation for that overreach.61 He is,
however, far less critical of the lawyers for the Trump
administration, who were equally successful in vindicating a
highly controversial policy that its opponents viewed as equally
overreaching and equally motivated by bigotry. He emphasizes
that the professionals in the Justice Department exercised their
considerable legal skills in effect to denude the travel bans of the
bigotry that were earlier attached to them, based in part on
comments by Candidate Donald Trump and comments by his
personal attorney, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.62
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Solicitor General: Charles Fahy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 31. 2014),
https://perma.cc/JJ94-9GV5.
60. See Dara E. Purvis, Herbert Wechsler, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/FFA8-LQ53 (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
61. See Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 176-80.
62. See id. at 201-16.
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Killenbeck acknowledges his suspicion that he is “in a distinct
minority within the academy in believing that a respectable [albeit
not totally convincing] argument can be made that by the third
iteration of the Trump immigration order [the one before the
Court], the adults in the room had purged the actual policy—and
hopefully its implementation—of the childish promises that
Candidate Trump had made as he pandered to his base.”63 He
notes that Giuliani emphasized that Trump had appointed a
“commission” that was charged to “do [what Trump wanted]
legally.”64 What this meant, among other things, was to present
“neutral” arguments that never once mentioned that the seven
targeted countries were overwhelmingly Muslim. Instead, the
lawyers focused on the fact that the Obama Administration itself
had expressed reservations about those seven countries and that
there were reasons to believe that potential travelers from those
countries needed more “extreme vetting” than is true of other
potential entrants to the United States.
I am not particularly interested in exploring whether one
should in fact be so generous either to the lawyers or, even more
to the point, the justices, led by Chief Justice Roberts, who
endorsed the policy in terms of its fidelity to constitutional
norms.65 Rather, in line with my general belief that the article
provides an almost unparalleled entryway into grappling with
what it means “to think like a constitutional lawyer,” I want to
suggest that deep and profound issues are raised by how we
choose to evaluate the lawyers in Hawaii.
Consider in this context an op-ed published in the December
20, 2020 New York Times with the remarkable title I’m Haunted
by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice Department.66 It
was written by Erica Newland, a graduate of the Yale Law School
who had served in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) from
2016-2018, i.e., the last year of the Obama Administration and
the first full year of the Trump Administration.67 The OLC, of
course, is one of the most prestigious divisions of the Department
63. Id. at 201.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417-21 (2018).
66. Erica Newland, I’m Haunted by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/JU7N-5BK5.
67. Id.
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of Justice. In many ways, it is more important than almost any
federal court, including the United States Supreme Court,
inasmuch as it is treated as offering dispositive opinions about
many issues relating to presidential power.
However important the OLC is as an empirical matter, it
confounds standard explanations that law professors often give
for the importance of Article III as establishing a truly
“independent” judiciary, signified, among other ways, by life
tenure. No one at OLC has life tenure; the head of the OLC—
analogous to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—is a
political appointee of the President (as is, one might argue, the
Chief Justice, for that matter) who, unlike the Chief Justice,
serves completely at the President’s pleasure.
Any
“independence” of OLC attorneys is guaranteed only by the
strength of their own characters and professional commitments,
not by the institutional protections we generally believe necessary
to protect such a separation from raw political pressure. It
perhaps should occasion no surprise that the OLC generally, even
if not always, is an ally of the President when asked to opine on
matters dealing with presidential authority. It is, for example,
only an opinion of the OLC and nothing else that has led to the
debatable insistence that a president cannot be indicted for
criminal misconduct during his administration, i.e., that
impeachment (or electoral defeat) is the only remedy for such
behavior.68 (This, of course, was the basis of Robert Mueller’s
failure to indict Donald Trump as part of his own inquiries as
Special Prosecutor). To be sure, not all decisions participated in
by the OLC are basically immune, at least empirically, from
judicial review, and one of them involved Trump’s travel ban.
So it is worth quoting Ms. Newland at some length:
My job was to tailor the administration’s executive actions
to make them lawful—in narrowing them, I could also make
them less destructive. . . .
But there was a trade-off: We attorneys diminished the
immediate harmful impacts of President Trump’s executive
orders—but we also made them more palatable to the courts.
68. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. Legal Couns.,
Amenability of the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal
Prosecution while in Office (Sept. 24, 1973).
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This burst into public view early in the Trump administration
in the litigation over the executive order banning travel from
several predominantly Muslim countries, which my office
approved. The first Muslim ban was rushed out the door. It
was sweeping and sloppy; the courts quickly put a halt to it.
The successive discriminatory bans benefited from more
time and attention from the department’s lawyers, who
narrowed them but also made them more technocratic and
therefore harder for the courts to block.69

Ms. Newland is ruthlessly forthright in her description of
many of the lawyers who gathered around candidate Trump (and,
one might add, around President Trump, especially after his
defeat by Joe Biden in the November 2020 election). The Trump
campaign had “relied on second-rate lawyers who lack[ed] the
skills” necessary to defend his actions before federal courts
staffed with capable judges (even including, one might say,
judges that he had appointed).70 She notes, for example that
Trump appointee Matthew Braun basically eviscerated an oral
argument offered by Giuliani, describing it as “strained legal
arguments without merit and speculative accusations, unpled in
the operative complaint and unsupported by evidence.”71 Thus,
she writes, “[e]ven judges appointed by Mr. Trump have refused
to throw their lots in with lawyers who can’t master the basic
mechanics of lawyering.”72 To put it mildly, professional career
attorneys at the Department of Justice, especially the OLC, have
mastered those skills.
So, what’s the problem? I think it is captured by Ms.
Newland’s use of the term “technocratic” in describing the
difference between the semi-competent coterie of lawyers
surrounding Trump and the dedicated professionals at the DOJ.73
What does that term mean in this context. I think a full answer
requires us to go all the way back to Plato’s dialogue Gorgias,
which examines the arts of rhetoric, of sophistry, taught by the
titular character, the most esteemed teacher of sophistry.74 What
69. Newland, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Steven Randall, Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Example of Plato’s
“Gorgias”, 10 PHIL. & RHETORIC 165, 165 (1977).
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is the measure of a successful sophist? It is the ability to make
“the lesser appear the greater,” that is, to present what should be
a losing argument in such a way as to persuade the audience,
including the judge, that it should in fact prevail.75 Socrates is not
impressed, since he is committed to the importance of both truth
and justice, neither of which is central to the perspective of the
sophist.76 Indeed, Socrates is appalled that Gorgias makes no
attempt, before admitting students to his school, to discern
whether or not they are aware of the difference between justice
and injustice or, for that matter, committed to the priority of truth
over falsehood even when that might be costly to achieving
success in one’s argument.77
So, for Ms. Newland, the “technical” prowess of her fellow
lawyers at the DOJ, perhaps within the Office of the Solicitor
General as well, is revealed by their ability to gain judicial
acceptance of policies that less skilled advocates might have
failed at achieving. Perhaps one might want to compare this to
“putting lipstick on a pig.” The pig might be more glamorous,
but, after all, it remains a pig. She no longer finds that admirable,
and she therefore left her position and, presumably, her hopes to
spend her career as a proud defender of the policies of the United
States government.
Students should read her column and address her worries. Is
she simply being self-servingly melodramatic? Should we really
wish the Department of Justice to be staffed by inferior lawyers
who will be less successful at defending policies that, on political
grounds, we object to? Or should we instead adopt the reigning
ideology of “adversarialism” that dictates that all sides in a legal
conflict are entitled to the very best legal representation possible,
which also seems to entail that one refrains from attributing to
lawyers the moral or political positions that might be identified
with their client. Just as a doctor should use all of her professional
skills to save Hitler, so, under this view, a lawyer should basically
be indifferent to the actual consequences attached to victory or
defeat for her client.
75. See CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE, REASON’S DARK CHAMPIONS: CONSTRUCTIVE
STRATEGIES OF SOPHISTIC ARGUMENT 21-22 (Thomas W. Benson ed., Univ. of S.C. Press
2010).
76. See id.
77. PLATO, GORGIAS 20-22 (E. M. Cope trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1864).
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Killenbeck offers interesting contrasts between the
Korematsu lawyers and those defending the Trump
Administration’s travel ban in Hawaii.78 The former basically
suppressed important factual evidence quite crucial to the overall
case. It is not merely that, like most lawyers, they offered only
the most favorable readings of precedents or otherwise engaged
in debatable readings of “the law.” Instead, they failed in a basic
duty of truthful representation of the facts before the Court. With
regard to defending the travel ban in Hawaii, however, no one
was really ignorant of the bigotry that had been part of the Trump
campaign or even the suggestion by Giuliani that the purpose of
the “commission” was to supply legalistic rationalizations for a
policy adopted for quite different reasons from those presented by
the lawyers. After all, isn’t it highly relevant that the Obama
Administration could be cited for engaging in what was arguably
at least somewhat similar concerns about travelers from the given
countries?
Mark Graber and I have in fact argued that judges should
take into account the fact—and we treat it as a fact—that Donald
J. Trump was uniquely unqualified to be President of the United
States, not only on grounds of inexperience, but also, and more
importantly, because he possesses such grievous character
flaws.79 It is safe to say, however, that relatively few of our
professional colleagues agree with us and that the legal academy,
perhaps still in thrall to Herbert Wechsler, is committed to a
notion of “neutral principles” that focuses almost exclusively on
the institutional nature of the presidency and, therefore, not at all
on the specific pathologies that might be present in a particular
President.80 This is why a would-be career attorney like Ms.
78. See Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 222 (explaining how the Korematsu lawyers
focused on suppression of important factual evidence to advance their goals while, in
contrast, those defending the travel ban in Hawaii blatantly exposed their goals, as well as
the reasons behind those goals long before Hawaii.).
79. See Mark A. Graber & Sanford Levinson, The Constitutional Powers of AntiPublian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21
CHAP. L. REV. 133, 138, 140 (2018). Our doubts about his fitness were, of course, amply
confirmed by his indefensible conduct following his clear defeat by Joseph R. Biden in the
November elections, culminating in his instigation of an insurrectionary occupation of the
Capitol by those who seemingly accepted his absolutely false narrative about election fraud
depriving him of his rightful victory.
80. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
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Newland can remain in the Department of Justice as the
presidency shifts from Barack Obama to Donald Trump. As she
put it, “I joined the department during the Obama administration,
as a career attorney whose work was supposed to be independent
of politics,” and she initially saw no real problems in remaining
to work for the Trump Administration.81 She now says she was
wrong.
But wherein was her actual error? Is it possible that she
didn’t pay sufficient attention to the fact that attorneys
representing the United States are always in effect committing
themselves to the political goals of a particular administration?
One suspects that she had little difficulty doing this with regard
to Obama. Obviously, that proved ultimately impossible only two
years later. How much leeway should we give any lawyer who is
basically behaving as a sophist in the service of clients engaged
in dubious behavior? One might be hesitant to go too far down
that road. I myself certainly believe that even the most vicious
among us are deserving of zealous representation when the state
brings its awesome power to bear on them by attempting
deprivation of liberty or even, as with capital punishment, their
very lives. But does the latitude I am willing to give the criminal
defense attorney necessarily carry over into all legal
representation?
I am not really sure what I think the answer should be. The
one thing I am certain about, though, is that this is a question very
much worth bringing to the attention of students embarking on
the path to becoming lawyers. They should be aware that
lawyers—and lawyering—have been the objects of criticism as
well as praise throughout the millennia. Complementing the
Socratic critique of “the-lawyer-as-sophist” is Jesus’ expression
of “Woe unto you, lawyers!”82 Surely all of us can name lawyers
we regard as heroes, worthy of emulation. Many Americans
clearly developed a special relationship with Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, “RBG.” But surely it is worth asking how we
81. Newland, supra note 66.
82. See Luke 11:46 (King James) (“And he said, Woe unto you also, [ye] lawyers! for
ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with
one of your fingers.”); Luke 11:52 (King James) (“Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken
away the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye
hindered.”).
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distinguish between our judicial heroes and those we might regard
as villains, such as the author of Dred Scott, Chief Justice Roger
Brooke Taney. Is Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott demonstrably
worse, save in its moral repugnance, than many other opinions of
the Supreme Court that we treat with far greater respect—and do
not assign to the anticanon?83
V. CONCLUSION: READ KILLENBECK CLOSELY
So much more could be said, but I have gone on long
enough. I hope, though, that I have demonstrated my central
point. This is one of the most important articles ever published in
any law review about the actuality of “doing” constitutional law.
It should be read closely and genuinely grappled with, and not
only in one’s capacity as an isolated reader. No article more
deserves to become the subject of genuine discussion and,
perhaps, even heated argument.

83. See MARK. A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EVIL 4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (rebutting the case that it is easy to demonstrate the
deficiencies of Taney’s opinion, whatever may be our own favorite approach to
“constitutional interpretation.”).

